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Douglas A. Galbi*
Regulatory policy in telecommunications is des-
perately in need of midlevel theory. There is wide-
spread consensus that regulators should try to
promote competition, but there is also bitter con-
tention about what this implies for particular in-
dustry contest. As one industry observer stated,
"Competition should be the policy. And code that
enables competition should be the rule."1 But this
same observer also argued that the Federal Com-
munications Commission ("FCC") should regu-
late and require AT&T to allow customers to
choose the internet service provider ("ISP") that
furnishes service over AT&T's cable facilities.2 A
pro-competition policy based solely on the pre-
mise that competition is good is fundamentally
flawed, since it advocates a competition policy
without analysis of the different structural pos-
sibilities for competition. Hence, "competition"
becomes merely a rhetorical device. Policymakers
must not considerjust the costs of promoting com-
petition, but also the profound implications on
the industiy structure. This is true regardless of
whether the policy to be considered is mandating
sub-loop unbundling, requiring line-sharing or
allowing the use of unbundled network elements
("UNEs") for the provision of leased lines.
Regulators must make strategic choices among
different structural possibilities that will promote
competition. 3 The common view that deregula-
* Senior Economist, Competitive Pricing Division, Com-
mon Carrier Bureau, Federal Communications Commission
("FCC"). The opinions and conclusions expressed in this pa-
per are those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect
the views of the FCC, its Commissioners or any staff other
than the author. I am grateful for numerous FCC colleagues
who have shared their insights and experience with me.
I See Lawrence Lessig, Cable Blackmail, THE STANDARD,




3 In considering the scope for strategic choice, there is
tion should occur once competition has devel-
oped is not a good framework for policy. Unlike
antitrust policy, which acts to restore suppressed
competition, pro-competitive regulation in a his-
torically monopolized industry has to assess the
merits of promoting new, different and often in-
compatible dimensions of competition. 4 Waiting
for competition to emerge before deregulating
fosters the illusion that the existing regulation
structure has no effect on the form and extent of
the competition that later develops. Regulatory
decisions must be based on an extensive consider-
ation of the way the proposed regulations will
later shape competition. Regulators, while staying
alert, humble and flexible, need to ponder what
feasible regulatory policies would bring about the
most beneficial development in industry struc-
ture.
This article attempts to expand the discussion
of this crucial question and forwards three pro-
positions:
(1) Structural problems are constraining beneficial
developments for internet services and voice telephony.
The challenges of defining meaningful prod-
ucts and establishing value-based interconnection
relationships for internet services are slowing the
development of new services that require differ-
ent billing protocols, qualities of service and relia-
bility. In voice telephony, pro-competitive regula-
an unfortunate tendency to gravitate toward poles of self-glo-
rification, such as Harvard's Lawrence Lessig, "we are, vis-A-
vis the laws of nature in this new space, gods," or, like Peter
Huber, of self-abnegation, "abolish the FCC." See Lawrence
Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L. J. 3,
7 (1996); see also Tom W. Bell, The Common Law in Cyberspace,
97 MICH. L. REv. (1999) (analyzing Huber's book). See gener-
ally PETER HUBER, LAW AND DISORDER IN CYBERSPACE: ABOLISH
THE FCC AND LET COMMON LAW RULE THE TELECOMSO
(1997).
4 The goal of regulation in a formerly monopolized in-
dustry is not just to restrain the monopoly power of the in-
cumbent. Cf Lessig, supra note 1.
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tion that does not adequately consider the costs
and benefits of promoting different forms of com-
petition may perpetuate costly, complex regula-
tory battles, and limit the scope for commercially
driven business reorganization and service innova-
tion.
(2)'Development of competing, independently owned
service interconnection points ("SIPs ") will stimulate de-
velopment of local facilities and wide-area services.
The development of SIPs would enable the sep-
aration of two different spheres of activity in tele-
communications networking and stimulate more
dynamic, decentralized industry growth. Telecom-
munications networking at its most abstract level
can be separated into two activities. First, the con-
nection of end-users to the network depends
heavily on idiosyncratic, location-specific knowl-
edge and equipment. In contrast, the second, the
provision of network services, is almost inherently
nonlocation specific, and relies upon standard-
ized routines and equipment. Thus, independent
businesses that interconnect these disparate activi-
ties would not only stimulate competition for the
provision of both end-user connectivity and net-
work services, but also for the SIPs themselves.
(3) Regulation of voice service interconnection should
promote competing, independently owned SIPs.
Regulation should promote competing, inde-
pendently owned SIPs by giving them the oppor-
tunity to have a privileged position for terminat-
ing voice calls. Existing regulatory authority and
practice largely shape interconnection for voice
telephony. While data traffic is growing much
more rapidly than voice traffic, the value and
bandwidth of voice traffic is still sufficient to influ-
ence strongly the overall structure of network in-
5 The Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires incum-
bent local exchange carriers ("incumbent LECs") to provide
interconnection at any technically feasible point within their
networks. See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2)(b) (1999 & Supp. It
1997). To implement other requirements of the 1996 Act,
the FCC has required incumbent LEC interconnection and
network elements to be priced based on the forward-looking
cost of the most efficient current network technology
deployed within the structure of the incumbent LEC's wire
centers (offices). See In re Implementation of the Local Com-
petition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 15449, 15844-56, paras.
672-703 (1996). The FCC's TELRIC rules make the price of
interconnection rates and network elements dependent on
the incumbent LEC's geographic structure of its wire centers.
See id. at para. 683. The Commission of the European Com-
munities has recommended maximum prices for local, sin-
gle-transit and double-transit interconnection, i.e. intercon-
terconnection. Preferential treatment for SIPs
would stimulate competition for voice-telephony
call termination within the current regulatory and
industry structure.
These propositions suggest that feasible
changes in the regulation of voice telephony in-
terconnection would result in a much more com-
petitive structure for the industry. Regulation thus
far has treated telephony interconnection archi-
tecture from the perspective of technical feasibil-
ity and requests from particular competitors.
Moreover, telephony interconnection regulations
have almost exclusively been defined in terms of
the incumbent operator's facilities and offices.
5
Given the enduring economic importance of in-
terconnection architecture, a broader perspective
should be considered. 6 The development of com-
peting, independently owned SIPs would provide
an industry structure conducive to better regula-
tory policy and more dynamic, decentralized in-
dustry growth.
I. STRUCTURAL LIMITATIONS TO THE
INTERNET
A worrisome aspect of the current structure of
internet services is that retail customers often
have little idea of what they are actually buying.
This is a recurring topic on internet user discus-
sion lists: "I bought a TI high-speed connection to
the internet. How do I make sure that I'm getting
the full service of the Ti?" Deceptively simple, this
query actually combines the customers two con-
nectivity concerns: bandwidth and quality of ser-
vice. When buying leased lines, such as a TI, 7 cus-
tomers are purchasing dedicated bandwidth
nection defined in terms of the hierarchy of the particular
company's telephony network. See 98/195/EC: Commission
Recommendation of 8January 1998 on interconnection in a liberal-
ised telecommunications market, Official Journal L. 228, 30-34,
Aug. 15, 1998.
6 The Peruvian regulator, OSIPTEL, has required the in-
cumbent Peruvian operator, Telefonica del Peru, to provide
at least one interconnection point in each of Peru's 24 de-
partments. Thus OSIPTEL has made a choice about the-geo-
graphic structure, but not the ownership or competitive
structure, of interconnection points with Telefonica. See
Legislacion en Telecomunicaciones, Decreto Supremo No 020-98-
MTC, para. 39 (visited Apr. 10, 2000) <www.osiptel.gob.pe/
marleg/cont/leg/leg/1998/ds2-98-mtc.htm>.
7 Leased lines are well-defined, established products, but
they have low average bandwidth utilization and high net-
work management costs.
[Vol. 8
Transforming Network Interconnection and Transport
between the customer's premises and the cus-
tomer's ISP. When a customer purchases a TI
from an ISP, the customer typically gets a "Ti's
worth" of dedicated bandwidth from the cus-
tomer to the ISP. But the physical connection is
not the only attribute that the customer values;
the customer also desires the particular connectiv-
ity services transported over the connection; and
the customer expects particular quality, reliability
and billing features in conjunction with those ser-
vices.
A. Quality of service, reliability and billing:
transactional, not technical challenges
ISPs currently face large challenges in attempt-
ing to differentiate their infrastructure-based ser-
vices to customers based on quality of service, reli-
ability and the availability of billing options. The
unstructured and dynamic nature of interconnec-
tion on the internet itself makes establishing new
types of infrastructure-based services difficult. The
long and tortuous discussions about "upgrading
the internet" from IPv4 to IPv6 illustrates the na-
ture of the challenges. Lower-profile examples of
infrastructure development problems include
small but annoying and persisting incompatibili-
ties in e-mail formats, the handling of extended
ASCII characters and the treatment of e-mail at-
tachments. The major weakness in the current
structure of the internet services industry is that
customers who need services not available using
current, generic internet connectivity must incur
high transaction costs because they must establish
a variety of different forms of service-level agree-
ments, such as virtual private networks and cus-
tomized peering arrangements.
Looking at transactions between ISPs, some in-
dustry observers and participants have voiced con-
cern that prevailing peering (interconnection)
practices impede the internet's development at
the wholesale level. As one noted in early 1998,
"the extant non-policy peering policy [is] the big-
gest threat to the future of a competitive in-
ternet." One recent article declared:
Contrary to popular belief, the biggest impediment to a
better, faster [i]nternet isn't technological. It's politi-
8 Jack Rickard, Editor's Notes, BOARDWATCH, May 1998, at
6 <www.boardwatch.internet.com/mag/98/may/bwm1.
html>.
9 Robin Gareiss, Tech Tutorial, Old Boys' Network, DATA
CoMM., Oct. 7, 1999 (visited Apr. 6, 2000) <www.data.com/
cal. The [i]nternet is composed of about 8,000 smaller
networks, and there are no rules (or laws) defining how
they're connected. As a result, ISPs engage in lengthy,
closed-door debates trying to determine how to con-
nect, who should pay more, and how upgrades will be
handled.9
Lack of mutual understanding and acceptance
of peering terms has led to disputes about traffic
routing, traffic balances and arrangements for in-
ternational interconnection.' 0
These disputes over peering illustrate the
problems posed in trying to allocate service value
rationally among networks that are intercon-
nected without an established service structure.
For example, suppose that network A has many
customers that it charges for internet access and
network B hosts several servers that provide infor-
mation over the internet. Network A passes server
queries to network B, and network B returns the
requested data to network A. The question is how
to determine what each of these two networks
owes the other for'network services. Suppose that
network B sends many more packets into network
A than it receives. It can be proposed that net-
work B should owe network A for the value of the
interconnection. However, on the other hand,
network A's customers, who pay for internet ser-
vice only to network A, requested the information
from network B, so perhaps network A should pay
for the value of the transport of the information
from network B. Note also that the content prov-
iders who hire network B to host their content
may have advertisers who want network A's sub:
scribers to see their advertisements, and may also
be collecting content subscription fees from net-
work A's access customers. Clearly, even this sim-
plified market structure model provides little gui-
dance as to how to rationally divide service value
between networks. It is not surprising that negoti-
ations over internet service interconnection are
contentious.
Two additional factors further confound at-
tempts to rationally allocate interconnection ser-
vice value. First, the networks that participate in
supplying a particulai service are not predefined.
The provision of a particular service for any par-
ticular end-user on a given network may involve
network traffic traversing two or more other net-
issu/99100/peering.htm>.
10 See Geoff Huston, Interconnection, Peering and Settlements
(visited Apr. 1, 2000) <www.isoc.org/inet99/proceedings/
le/le_l.htm> (discussing internet interconnection).
2000]
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works ad hoc, since the networks involved in rout-
ing the data can change rapidly in response to
changes in overall network traffic patterns. Sec-
ond, interconnection between networks is typi-
cally not negotiated on a service-specific basis but
instead assessed in terms of packet transport be-
cause the internet is a platform for the provision
of a wide variety of services. Thus, the simple form
that packet-based peering agreements currently
take constrains transaction costs within an indus-
try structure, but does not offer any guidance for
the rational allocating interconnection service
value because they obscure the economic signals
relevant to interconnection service value.
The difficulty that ISPs experience differentiat-
ing infrastructure services for their retail custom-
ers is directly related to the problem of allocating
interconnection service value. Considered from
the perspective of market supply, the poorly de-
veloped and differentiated market for intercon-
nection services constrains the development of re-
tail products that use interconnection services.
From a demand perspective, the economic trans-
actions that define the current internet industry
structure generate only highly attenuated trans-
missions of consumer value to agents making rele-
vant network investment decisions. The current
industry structure, therefore, discourages compe-
tition and instead provides a strong impetus to
consolidation because services provided end-to-
end within one company's network face none of
the transactional challenges outlined above.
Without structural change in the internet, small
ISPs will have few or no opportunities to preserve
and develop their businesses other than continu-
ally bargaining with a few large network opera-
tors. Current regulatory policy, then, fosters
neither a dynamic industry nor decentralized in-
novation. Instead, small ISPs are likely to struggle
to ensure their survival through political means.
As an example, consider approximately 1,400
small, independent local telephone companies in
the U.S., which benefit from special regulatory
treatment. These companies have effectively or-
'I 47 U.S.C § 153(37)(B)-(C) (1999 & Supp. II 1997).
12 See id. § 153(37)(B)-(C).
'3 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C § 254 (1999 & Supp. H 1997).
14 E.g., FCC, OPP WORKING PAPER 31, THE FCC AND THE
UNREGULATION OF THE INTERNET (authored by.lason Oxman)
(1999) [hereinafter UNREGULATION OF THE INTERNET].
15 See generally In re Amendment of Section 64.702 of the
Commission's Rules and Regulations (Second Computer In-
ganized themselves through associations such as
the National Exchange Carriers Association
("NECA"), the National Telephone Cooperative
Association ("NTCA") and the Organization for
the Preservation and Advancement of Small Tele-
phone Companies ("OPASTCO"). Under Sec-
tions 3(37)(B) and (C) of the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1934 ("the Act" or "the
Communications Act"),'' rural telephone compa-
nies are defined as any telephone company that is
sufficiently small enough to meet the criteria
under the Act, irrespective of where they are lo-
cated.12 Rural telephone companies are extended
special regulatory and universal service benefits.'
3
B. Public policy for internet infrastructure:
"don't change anything"
Public policy for internet infrastructure has not
responded to these increasingly serious industry
challenges. The U.S. regulatory framework for in-
ternet infrastructure was established fifteen to
twenty years ago. The governing principle for in-
ternet regulation is "don't change anything. " 1 4 An
FCC order in 1980 decided that enhanced ser-
vices are not subject to common carrier regula-
tion. 15 Internet services have been classified as en-
hanced services, and hence, they have not been
subject to the many regulations that govern inter-
connection for voice telephony. 16 Moreover,
based on a 1983 FCC decision, enhanced service
providers are treated as end-users. 17 Thus, ISPs
can purchase flat-rated end-user offerings from lo-
cal telephony companies and avoid a separate set
of regulated prices, including per minute charges,
that local telephony companies apply to switched
voice telephony customers who are classified as
"telecommunications carriers."
As argued above, the challenges associated with
defining meaningful products and value-based in-
terconnection relationships appear to be con-
straining the internet from developing even more
impressively than it is now. However, attempts to
address these issues directly have not been suc-
quiry), Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 419 (1980) [hereinaf-
ter Computer I ].
I1I See UNREGULATION OF THlE INTERNET, supra notel4, at
10-12.
17 See generally In re MTS and WATS Market Structure,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 97 F.C.C.2d 682, 711-22
(1983).
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cessful. For example, in the summer of 1999, for-
mer FCC Chairman Reed Hundt attempted to set
up an industry forum to address internet inter-
connection. The forum's goal: "to stave off poten-
tial government regulation of peering by deter-
mining how large internet service providers can
fairly interconnect their networks with smaller
counterparts."1 8 The forum intended to address
"financial settlements for interconnection and
whether different charges should apply for differ-
ent types of traffic." 19
Several months later, Mr. Hundt was reported
as saying:
'What I'm finding everywhere is indecision,' he
[Hundt] says. 'There's a lot of interest, but no consen-
sus.' And that inability to find common ground is what
concerns him. His original view was that peering would
be settled in one of three ways: by a forum, market
forces, or regulation. Now that the forum route seems
not to be working, Hundt fears that regulators might
step in.
2 0
A year earlier, another leading trade publica-
tion noted, "Talk of any type of government inter-
vention, from the Justice Department or the
[FCC], scares everyone in the game."2 ' One
might imagine that having a former Chairman of
the FCC discuss these issues would heighten inter-
ests in resolving these concerns. If anything, the
failure of this effort and others2 2 suggests that the
great difficulty in resolving internet interconnec-
tion issues can only be corrected by a change in




Policy-makers around the world proclaim their
determination to promote telecommunications
competition. But backing this desire to promote
competition in telecommunications requires an-
swering the question of what specific scope and
18 Robin Gareiss, Hundt to Set Up Peering Forum, DATA
COMMUNICATIONS, June 1999 (visited Apr. 1, 2000) <www.
data.com/story/DCM19990610S0001 .html>.
19 Id.
20 Robin Gareiss, Tech Tutorial, Old Boys' Network, DATA
COMMUNICATIONS, Oct. 7, 1999 (visited Apr. 2, 2000) <www.
data.com/issue/991007.html>.
21 Bill McCarthy, ISPs Agree on Little, But They Don't Want
the Government to Choose Their Peers, BoARDwATCI-, May 1998
(visited Apr. 1, 2000) <http://www.boardwatch.com/mag/
98/may/bwm74.html>.
manner of competition should be promoted. Un-
fortunately, this "competition for what?" question
has not been adequately considered or answered.
The inability to answer this question by defining
exactly what services should be open to competi-
tion and what that competition should "look" like
has significant long-run costs: current voice te-
lephony regulation may be unintentionally pro-
moting an industry structure for competition that
is much less beneficial than the alternatives. In a
sense, policy-makers are flying by the seat of their
pants and holding on for dear life, hoping that
everything will turn out for the best wherever the
plane happens to land.
A. Avoiding judgements about competitive
structure
It is clear that despite the enactment of a broad
range of pro-competitive policies, telecommunica-
tions policy analysts and policy-makers are reluc-
tant to directly consider competition from a struc-
tural perspective. Instead, policy-makers have
assumed responsibility for promoting competition
for everything, everywhere. There is seldom any
consideration of whether competition in any
given industry segment is feasible or even desira-
ble, although regulators are generally pledged to
protect consumers from any unfortunate effects
of competition. 2-3 The policy concept of "competi-
tive neutrality" appears to mean that the regula-
tor, while promoting competition for everything,
must ensure that regulation does not promote
one type of competition more than another. Such
rhetoric, while incoherent, emphasizes that regu-
latory considerations of competitive structure are
preparations for exercising regulatory discretion.
Regulatory discretion is considered an undesir-
able and unnecessary aspect of sound pro-compet-
itive policy.
22 See, e.g., Brokered Private Peering Group, BOARDWATCH,
May 1998 (visited Apr. 1, 2000) <http://www.boardwatch.
com/mag/98/may/bwm29.html>.
23 Others have analyzed whether more competition in
U.S. long-distance services is an appropriate policy goal. See
Douglas Galbi, The Price of Telecom Competition: Counting the
Cost of Advertising and Promotion, I INFO 133-193 (Apr. 1999);
Douglas Galbi, Regulating Prices for Shifting Between Service Prov-




1. Failure of the technocratic approach
In traditional neo-classical economics and pub-
lic utility theory, analyses of technology and de-
mand provided the analytical basis for judge-
ments about competitive structure. The key
phrase in this approach is "natural monopoly."
24
Based on estimates of the characteristics of pro-
duction functions and consumer demand, the in-
dustry is partitioned into markets, and the mar-
kets are classified as either "workably competitive"
or "naturally monopolistic. '2 5 Regulators promote
competition in markets that are "workably com-
petitive" and continue to regulate markets that
are "naturally monopolistic."
26
Unfortunately, this approach provides limited
guidance for current pro-competitive policy.
When telephony was a radically different business
from cable service, when switching costs were not
driven by development of the computerized
switch, and when wireless telephony and the in-
ternet did not exist, economists analyzed whether
particular parts of the telephone network were a
natural monopoly. The fact that today's industry
is marked by convergence, dynamic demand and
technological change makes this traditional analy-
sis much more difficult.
More significantly, this approach obscures cen-
tral policy considerations. First, it ignores the ef-
fects of regulation on the structure of competi-
tion. Interconnection regulation might mitigate
economies of scope that would otherwise preserve
a "natural monopoly." More generally, the deter-
mination of a "workably competitive" market can-
not occur prior to consideration of regulation.
Second, the time frame of the development of
competition should be a key regulatory concern.
For example, a "workably competitive" market for
facilities-based broadband connectivity to resi-
24 Herbert Hovenkamp, ECONOMICS AND ANTITRUST LAw
31-36 (1985).
25 Herbert Hovenkamp, FEDERAL ANTTRUST POLICY: THE
LAW OF COMPETITION AND PRACrICE § 15 (1994).
26 Id. at § 19.2a. The author thanks Mr. Tim Brennan,
who provided substantive comment for this paragraph.
27 See generally Charles D. Cosson, You Say You Want a
Revolution? Fact and Fiction Regarding Broadband CMRS and Lo-
cal Competition, 7 COMMLAW CONSPEcTus 233 (1999) (critiqu-
ing latter view).
28 In 1980, for example, the FCC designed an access
charge regime for interconnection between local exchange
carriers and long-distance carriers in order to promote long-
distance voice competition. Further encouraged by the Modi-
fied Final Judgement ("MFJ") that separated AT&T's long
dences might develop over a time span that is too
long to deliver benefits comparable to the imposi-
tion of a loop unbundling requirement on the in-
cumbent telephony provider.
The technocratic approach largely fails to in-
form current telecommunications policy. Policy-
makers now generally ignore the technocratic ap-
proach to making judgements about competitive
structure, not because of its weaknesses, but be-
cause they now largely attempt to avoid making
judgements about competitive structure. A deter-
mination to promote competition everywhere in
the telecommunications industry might be taken
to imply the judgement that there are no natural
monopolies in the industry. But policy-makers
have not made that judgement.
2. Focus on incumbent monopolists' products and
networks
Pro-competitive policy attempts to avoid mak-
ingjudgements about competitive structure by as-
suming that the incumbent monopolists' products
and network elements define the realm of rele-
vant competitive possibilities. The results of this
crude reasoning leads to flawed conclusions that
competition will lower prices but will not alter the
industry or marketplace structure, or that an
emerging technology, such as wireless communi-
cations service, will evolve to be the exact replace-
ment of the incumbent services. In the case of
wireless, this reasoning would invite the conclu-
sion that wireless and wireline local exchange ser-
vices were equivalent substitutes for each other.
27
An example of a more sophisticated application
of this reasoning is the FCC's attempt to establish
policies and rules for competition in switched
voice transport to incumbent end-offices.28 The
distance services from the Regional Bell Operating Compa-
nies' ("RBOCs") local exchange services, industry develop-
ments led MCI and Sprint to build independent national net-
works that could effectively substitute AT&T's long-distance
voice services. See United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.,
552 F. Supp. 131 (D. D.C. 1982). The MFJ placed a constraint
on the further expansion of competition down into the
RBOCs' local exchange networks. Under the MFJ, the
RBOCs were required through Sept. 1, 1991 to charge an
equal amount per minute for all switched voice traffic
originated and terminated for interexchange carriers (the
"equal charge" rule). See id. at 233-34. Thus, for switched
voice traffic, interexchange carriers had no incentive to inter-
connect with RBOCs at end offices rather than at tandems.
See id. at 199. Competition for RBOCs' interoffice switched
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recent policies focused on extensive unbundling
of the incumbents' network elements. These poli-
cies implicitly sanction the view that competition
will develop for elements of the incumbents' net-
works, if competition develops at all. Twisted to
another level, a recent paper implicitly proposes
that unbundling should not be imposed to enable
competitors to provide products that the incum-
bent operator does not provide.
29
3. The rise of the client-driven approach
Regulators also avoid considering the impact of
industry structure on competition by taking a cli-
ent-driven approach when formulating pro-com-
petitive regulatory policy. For example, Company
B, a competitive local exchange carrier ("competi-
tive LEC"), argues that the regulator must require
incumbent carrier, Company A, to do X so that
Company B can provide service Y. In this scenario,
Company A would be typically described as a mo-
nopolist, and X would be deemed as essential to
the provision of Y. Moreover, service Y is a highly
desired service by many end-users because it will
be better or lower-priced than the current alterna-
tive. Responding to Company B's request, the reg-
ulator requires Company A to do X in the interest
of promoting competition. However, the regula-
tor does not require Company B to actually provide
Y, nor does the regulator require Company B to
provide Y at a better or lower price than the identified
alternative because doing so would be considered
"intrusive" regulation. The disadvantages of this
voice transport was economically impossible. See In re Imple-
mentation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Tele-
communications Act of 1996, First Report and Order, 11 FCC
Rcd. 15499, 15508-09, paras. 11-12 (1996).
After the expiration of the MFJ's equal charge nile, the
FCC established new rules to foster the development of com-
petition for transport between the incumbent network opera-
tors' offices. See In re Transport Rate Structure and Pricing,
Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 6
FCC Rcd. 5341 (1991). The FCC abolished the equal charge
rule and established a more complicated rate structure with a
lower effective interconnection rate for end-office intercon-
nection. See id. at 5344-48, paras. 15-36. In a series of trans-
port restructuring orders beginning in Oct. 1992, the Com-
mission required local exchange carriers to offer interoffice
transport on a flat-rated, unbundled basis. See In re Transport
Rate Structure and Pricing, Report and Order and Further Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, 7 FCC Rcd. 7006, 7007-8, paras. 1-2
(1992). Around the same time period, the Commission is-
sued a series of orders also requiring large local exchange
operators to offer collocation for interconnection for leased
lines and switched voice services at any local or tandem ex-
ad hoc approach are clear. The scope and nature
of the competition actually promoted by the regu-
lation is highly dependant upon the nature of re-
quested regulatory action and the regulator's re-
sponse to this request. Further, the development
of competition is dependant upon what compa-
nies actually do with the regulatory rights and ad-
vantages that they gain.
The Telecommunications Act of 199630 sup-
ports this approach, but it does not require it. Sec-
tion 251(c) (3)31 of the Act identifies duties of in-
cumbent LECs to provide access to network
elements in response to requests from telecom-
munications carriers seeking to provide telecom-
munications services. Section 251(d) (2)32 gives
the FCC the responsibility for defining the scope
of these duties. Under Section 251 (d) (2) (B),3- an
"impair" limitation on access duties is set out in
the context of a telecommunications carrier
"seeking access to provide the services that it seeks
to offer." However, the "necessary" limitation on
access duties in Section 251 (d) (2) (A) 34 is not put
in this context. One might imagine a form of ac-
cess that is necessary to provide a telecommunica-
tions service that a telecommunications carrier
seeks to offer, but that is not necessary to promote
a pro-competitive, deregulatory strategy for the in-
dustry. Moreover, Section 251(d) (2) 3 5 sets out
minimum access standards that the FCC must
consider.36 Additional access standards associated
with a broader vision for pro-competitive, deregu-
latory industry development appear to be permis-
sible, but they have not been explored.
change for which they received a bonafide request for colloca-
tion. See In re Expanded Interconnection with Local Tele-
phone Company Facilities, Second Report and Order, 8 FCC
Rcd. 7374, 7402-16, paras. 45-69 (1993). These rules envi-
sioned flat-rated, facilities-based competition between incum-
bent operators' local exchange and tandem offices, and their
primary objective was to drive down interconnection costs for
long-distance switched voice telephony. See id. at 7376, para.
I.
29 See generally Jerry A. Hausman and J. Gregory Sidak, A
Consumer-Welfare Approach to the Mandatory Unbundling of Tele-
communications Networks, 109 YALE L.J. 417 (1999) (proposing
new standards for mandated unbundling of network ele-
ments by ILECs).
30 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,
110 Stat. 56 (codified at scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
'31 47 U.S.C. § 251 (c) (3) (1994 & Supp. IV 1997).
32 47 U.S.C. § 251 (d) (2) (1994 & Supp. IV 1997).
33 Id. at. § 251 (d) (2) (B).
4 Id. at. § 251 (d) (2) (A).
35 Id. at. § 251 (d) (2).
36 See id. at § 251(d) (2).
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B. Unintentional aspects of emerging industry
structure
Although policy-makers have been preoccupied
with the extent of competition and its speed of
development, industry performance also depends
on other aspects of competitive structure. Even in
a communications industry in which all product
markets are workably competitive, at least two
sorts of potential weaknesses could exist. First, the
industry, although competitive, might not be ca-
pable of re-organizing itself quickly to adjust to
changes in the technology or the scope of poten-
tial trades. Second, the industry, although com-
petitive, might dissipate significant economic
value as companies continually appeal to the reg-
ulator to decide narrow, complex issues concern-
ing the distribution of value between companies.
Aspects of pro-competitive regulatory policies for
voice telephony may be contributing to the devel-
opment of such weaknesses.
Current pro-competitive regulatory policies for
voice telephony are increasing the cost of adjust-
ing a geographic structure of incumbent end-of-
fices that could be highly inefficient. The geo-
graphic structure of incumbent telephone
operators' end-offices was largely established
prior to 1917. Given subsequent dramatic devel-
opments in switching and transport technology,
this structure is likely to be highly inefficient. Pro-
competitive regulation, however, is now deeply
connected to the existing structure of incum-
bents' networks. Such regulations have parti-
tioned incumbents' networks into elements de-
fined in terms of incumbents' existing end-offices.
Regulated rates for interconnection have been de-
fined in terms of tandem and end-office hierar-
chies. Competitors have been granted regulatory
rights to collocate in incumbent end-offices.
Given such regulations, changes in the structure
37 The New York Public Service Commission ("NY PSC")
required virtual collocation for private line service in 1989
and physical collocation for switched services in 1992. See gen-
erally In re Application by Bell Atlantic New York for Authori-
zation Under Section 271 of the Communications Act to Pro-
vide In-Region, InterLATA Service in the State of New York,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 FCC Rcd. 3953 (1999)
(detailing and citing New York PSC orders).
38 Initially, the FCC required physical collocation. See In
re Expanded Interconnection with Local Telephone Com-
pany Facilities; Amendment of the Part 69 Allocation of Gen-
eral Support Facility Costs, Report and Order and Notice of Pro-
of incumbents' network are likely to occur much
more slowly.
Moreover, collocation rules have created nar-
row, complex and enduring regulatory battles be-
tween companies. State regulatory commissions in
the U.S. began to require collocation in incum-
bents' offices as early as 1989. 3 7 The FCC began to
establish national collocation rules in 1992.38 Yet
companies are still battling intensely over narrow
issues that affect the value of collocation obliga-
tions. For example, a 1999 FCC order decided,
among other issues, that collocating carriers are
allowed to construct their own facilities for cross-
connecting among themselves; and that incum-
bent LECs must provide "shared collocation,"
"cageless collocation," and collocation in adjacent
controlled environments if collocation space is ex-
hausted. 9 The FCC also issued the following re-
quirement:
[A] n incumbent LEC that denies collocation of a com-
petitor's equipment, citing safety concerns, must pro-
vide to the competitive LEC within five business days a
list of all equipment that the incumbent LEC locates
within the premises in question, together with an affida-
vit attesting that all of that equipment meets or exceeds
the safety standard that the incumbent LEC contends
the competitor's equipment fails to meet.
40
A large number of other issues, at this level of
detail, are emerging with respect to loop-sharing,
managing interference among loops ("cross
talk"), sub-loop unbundling, and the use of vari-
ous combinations of wholesale network services or
elements.
Attempts to implement unbundled access to
the incumbents' network have quickly led to the
recognition that information systems for pre-or-
dering, ordering, provisioning, repair, mainte-
nance and billing ("OSS") determine the useful-
ness of the access gained to the physical facilities.
Regulators must not only regulate access to the
network physical plant, but also deal with issues
posed Rulemaking, 7 FCC Rcd. 7369, para. 1 (1992). This
requirement was overturned in court, so the FCC enacted a
virtual collocation requirement. See Bell Atlantic Tel. Co. v.
FCC, 24 F.3d 1441 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996 gave the FCC authority to require physical
collocation. See 47 U.S.C. § 251 (c) (6) (1999 & Supp. II
1997).
'I See generally Deployment of Wireline Service Offering
Advanced Telecommunications Capability, First Report and Or-
der and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 14 FCC Rcd. 4761
(1999).
40 Id. at para. 36.
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relating to the incumbent carrier's information
systems capabilities and performance. The regula-
tory fight between incumbent and competitive
carriers moves from argument over actual physi-
cal access to the network, to a dispute over the
ease of access to the mandated unbundled ele-
ments. For example, both the parties and FCC
noted that competitive carriers using BellSouth's
network must scroll through lists of products and
services to fulfill particular customer orders.4' By
contrast, BellSouth's own retail interface allows its
customer service representatives to find a product
or service simply by typing the first few letters of
the product's name. 42 A recent independent test
done for regulatory purposes of Bell Atlantic's
OSS in New York State involved statistics for 855
test elements. 43 But such tests have merely estab-
lished a level of incumbent LEC performance and
did not determine the ease of access.
The development of detailed regulation and lit-
igation over the access to a network operators' in-
formation systems will likely come at a high cost.
While technology is rapidly driving down the cost
of switching and transport hardware,44 the most
important challenge to competition is to foster a
wider range of network management capabilities
and to promote quicker, more customized ser-
vice. 45 Any regulation requiring an incumbent
network operator to provide nondiscriminatory
access to its OSS could diminish the incumbent's
incentives to improve its OSS.46 There is nothing
that would indicate that subjecting OSS systems to
the litigation and the adversarial process would
not make improvements to the incumbent's sys-
tems more risky and problematic.
In regulated industries, companies and custom-
41 See Application of BellSouth Corporation to Provide
In-Region, InterLATA Services in South Carolina, Memoran-
dum Opinion and Order, 13 FCC Rcd. 539, 634, para. 174
(1997).
42 See id.
43 See Common Carrier Action; Federal Commission Au-
thorizes Bell Atlantic to Provide Long Distance Service in
New York, Report No. CC 99-60, CC Dkt. No. 99-295 (rel.
Dec. 22, 1999).
44 In 1998, software accounted for 40% of capital spend-
ing for MCI WorldCom, while switching and transport ac-
counted for 6% and 19%, respectively. In contrast, in 1988
software accounted for 3% of MCI's capital spending, while
switching and transported accounted for 19% and 44%, re-
spectively. MCI WorldCom expects that switching and trans-
port will amount to less than 25% of capital spending per
year within a few years. John Sidgmore, MCI WorldCom Vice
Chairman, presentation to stock analysts (Spring 1999). ,
45 In 1998, MCI WorldCom's cost for delivering one min-
ers tend to acquire quasi-property rights in ex-
isting arrangements. Thus, as companies and cus-
tomers make plans and investments based on the
wide range of regulatory rights being established
for telephony, the existing regulatory structure
becomes entrenched and the possibility of der-
egulation in the future narrows. The regulator
then would be called upon by the market partici-
pants to continually police the value of acquired
rights. Emerging market opportunities, however,
may gradually erode the value of rights acquired
under telephony regulation and result in a mar-
ket-driven, decentralized deregulation. For exam-
ple, a telecommunications carrier has obtained
the right to do "x" for price "pl." If subsequent
market development results in "x" being freely of-
fered for price p2, which is less than the original
price pl, then the communication carriers origi-
nal regulatory right has become far less valuable
to it and will be "liquidated." This "liquidation"
would also occur if a more cost-effective opportu-
nity than "x" emerges or if for some other reason
"x" is no longer a useful right.
However, this liquidation of regulatory rights
will inevitably follow from industry growth and the
development of competition. For example, if in-
cumbent LECs' end-offices become key network
interconnection points, then collocation rights
may endure long beyond the growth of competi-
tive telecommunications networks. Regulated
rights associated with complex information sys-
tems like OSS are likely to be difficult to liquidate
because of the momentum of idiosyncratic invest-
ments necessary to establish compatible software
and business practices. Thus, policy-makers and
industry participants need to consider the possi-
ute of voice traffic broke down as follows: OSS, 5%; switch-
ing, 3%; transport, 4%; operating costs, 26%; and access (in-
terconnection fees), 62%. John Sidgmore, MCI WorldCom
Vice Chairman, presentation to stock analysts (Spring 1999).
46 Under the Section 271 requirements of the 1996 Act,
for OSS functions that are analogous to those operations that
a BOC provides to itself, its customers or its affiliates, the
nondiscrimination standard requires the BOC to offer re-
questing carriers access that is equivalent in terms of quality,
accuracy and timeliness. The BOC must provide access that
permits competing carriers to perform these functions in
"substantially the same time and manner" as the BOC. In re
Application by Bell Atlantic-NY for Authorization to Provide
In-Region, InterLATA Services in South Carolina, Memoran-
dum Opinion and Order, 13 FCC Rcd. 539, 593, para. 85 (1997)
[hereinafter Bell Atlantic Application]. Such regulation lessens




ble significance of what economists call "hystere-
sis" or "lock-in" effects. 47 Indeed, the parties
themselves may encourage rapid growth of grand-
father clauses to perpetuate the effects of legacy
regulations long beyond the relevance of the pol-
icy concerns that motivated them. Competition
will occur, but only in the context of regulations
that hinder industry change and foster wasteful
regulatory battles.
III. MAKING JUDGMENTS ABOUT
PROPITIOUS INDUSTRY STRUCTURE
Careful analysis and industry observation can
provide a basis for making useful judgments
about industry structure. The intention is not to
forecast the future, even less to provide a compre-
hensive development plan for the industry. The
objective is to identify key economic distinctions
that appear to be relatively stable, explore their
implications for beneficial industry development
and look for nascent industry trends that may pro-
vide a foundation for promoting such develop-
ment.
A. Economic Analysis
Connecting end-users to a telecommunications
network is a local business.48 Constructing these
connections requires careful consideration of lo-
cal topology and economic geography. Construct-
ing these connections also requires careful con-
sideration of local regulations and politics;
wireline network operators need to secure exten-
sive rights-of-way from local governments and
wireless operators need to place antennae. More-
over, in the U.S. in 1990, approximately 28% of
all housing units were multiple dwelling units,
and the share of such units is significantly higher
in other countries.4 9 To gain access to end-users,
network operators often have to enter into highly
location-specific, idiosyncratic negotiations with
47 C.f Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services,
504 U.S. 451, 474-76 (1992) (recognizing. that a "lock-in" ef-
fect is created when customers encounter high costs to switch
suppliers).
48 George Ford, formerly of the Competition Division of
the FCC's Office of General Counsel and now at MCI
WorldCom, has emphasized this point to me in discussions of
industry economics.
49 See Promotion of Competitive Networks in Local Tele-
communications Markets, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and
the owners of buildings, campuses and managed
housing tracts. National regulation can play a role
in addressing these challenging issues, and the
FCC has been actively considering a variety of
questions and regulations. 50 Nonetheless, no na-
tional regulations are likely to be able to trans-
form end-user connections into a standardized,
nationally negotiated and managed service.
In contrast, providing network services is inher-
ently a nonlocal business relying on standardized
routines and infrastructure capabilities. The ubiq-
uity of e-mail services depends on addressing,
routing and formatting standards. Requesting and
serving web pages requires additional widely im-
plemented standards. The nature of such stan-
dards is largely independent of local knowledge
and infrastructure, and the service provided is not
related to any geographical location. Customers
do not necessarily care where Amazon.com's serv-
ers are physically located. For products that it can
deliver in electronic form, Amazon.com does not
necessarily care where its customers are physically
located either.5' Moreover, Amazon.com can ex-
pand its capacity to deliver electronic products to
customers simply by installing additional stan-
dardized hardware. 52 Stock market valuations for
companies such as Amazon.com have soared
largely because their business models readily scale
to global commerce.
Dividing customer value between local connec-
tivity and wide-area network services is a funda-
mental economic problem. While no amount of
head-scratching and eye-gouging can resolve this
issue, industry performance will depend heavily
on the quality of the arrangements that are
worked out. The most important resource for
working out such arrangements is relevant infor-
mation. The best way to generate such informa-
tion is to have customers choose among different
combinations of local connectivity and wide-area
network services.
Notice of Further Inquiry and Third Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 14 FCC Rcd. 12673, 12681, para. 29 (1999).
50 See id. at 12674-83, paras. 1-17; see also In re Telecom-
munications Services Inside Wiring, Report and Order and Sec-
ond Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 FCC Rcd. 3569
(1997).
51 A supporting electronic payment infrastructure, such
as that for credit cards, is also necessary.
52 To the extent that customer support requires human
interaction, this is an additional cost factor in scaling service.
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B. Institutional Implications
The above economic analysis suggests that good
industry performance is likely to depend on the
presence of businesses that provide effective sepa-
ration of local connectivity from wide-area net-
work services. I will refer to businesses that serve
this function as service interconnection points
("SIPs"). SIPs would compete locally in coordinat-
ing wide-area network services for local end-users.
An SIP would lease local facilities providing con-
nectivity to end-users and would host and inter-
connect to facilities distributing wide-area net-
work services. To mediate effectively between
local connectivity and wide-area network services
within a relevant geographic location, an SIP
should not be owned by either a local facilities
provider or wide-area network service provider.
This allows a local facilities provider in one area
to own an SIP in an area in which the local pro-
vider does not provide local facilities. Similarly, a
wide-area network service provider could own an
SIP, as long as that SIP is not connected directly
to other SIPs using the wide-area network service
provider's facilities.
Competing, independently owned SIPs would
effectively define the product and the value pro-
position for local facilities builders. The product
for local facilities builders would be connectivity
from end-users to SIPs; thus, this connectivity
could be defined in terms of the types of attrib-
utes currently used to define end-to-end connec-
tivity for leased lines. Competition among SIPs
would allow the value of wide-area services to be
transmitted to agents considering investments in
local facilities. The higher the value to end-users
of the wide-area services, the greater the amount
SIPs would be willing to pay local facilities inves-
tors to connect end-users to the SIP. By helping to
define a local product and value proposition for
53 See MILTON MUELLER, UNIVERSAL SERVICE; COMPETI-
TION, INTERCONNECTION, AND MONOPOLY IN THE MAKING OF
THE AMERCAN TELEPHONE SYs. 40 (1997).
54 See id. at Chapter 6.
55 See id. at 148.
56 See id. at 146-49.
57 In 1917, there were 19,550 local exchange offices in
the U.S. See id at 147. In 1998, local exchange carriers re-
ported a total of 18,700 local exchange switches to the FCC.
See 1998 Statistics of Common Carriers, at Table 2.10 (visited
Apr. 7, 2000) <http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common . ./
Fcc-StateLink/SOCC/scc98idx.html>. The Oct. 1999 LERG
lists 22,860 distinct office codes for incumbent LECs, of
which about 4,300 appear to be multiple references to listed
connectivity, SIPs would foster investment in local
facilities.
Enabling localization of investment in commu-
nications facilities played a key role in the devel-
opment of rural telephony. The U. S. Managers of
the Bell System, which held Alexander Graham
Bell's original telephone patents, believed that
telephone service was primarily of value to busi-
ness users in major cities. In 1894, after seventeen
years of commercial activity, the Bell System had
installed nearly 90% of its phones for business
subscribers. 53 Independent, locally financed com-
mercial telephone companies, community-ori-
ented mutual companies and farmers' coopera-
tives brought telephony to small agricultural cities
and rural areas.54 By 1920, 38.7% of American
farms had telephone service, whereas only 30% of
American households did.5 5 Historical conditions
fostered decentralized investment in local access
facilities, which allowed telephone service to cover
all of the U.S.56 The geographic structure of local
exchanges that was established prior to 1917 still
essentially defines the current geographic struc-
ture for current U. S. interconnection regula-
tion. 57 A set of competing, independently owned
SIPs could recreate incentives for decentralized
investment in local access facilities.
SIPs also would facilitate low-cost wide-area
bandwidth transactions. Some industry partici-
pants foresee commodity markets emerging for
bandwidth. 58 Such markets could help provide ap-
propriate signals for wide-area network invest-
ment and lessen the cost of rolling out new wide-
area services. 59 The development of such a market
will depend on establishing a widely recognized
set of nodes among which bandwidth can be
traded. SIPs could serve effectively as nodes for a
bandwidth market.
A well-developed layer of competing SIPs would
U S West offices.
58 Enron has made the most extensive public proposal to
date. See Enron Broadband Services (visited Apr. 7, 2000)
<http://www.ec.enron.com/bandwidth/>. Companies active
in bandwidth brokerage and trading include Arbinet (visited
Apr. 7, 2000) <hwww.arbinet.com>; Band-X (visited Apr. 7,
2000) <http://www.band-x.com>; and RateXchange (visited
Apr. 7, 2000) <www.ratexchange.com>.
59 The development of such a market should not be
taken for granted. Attempts to establish commodity markets
have historically had a high failure rate even among products
with propitious characteristics. See generally D. G. Black, Suc-




provide a lattice upon which new wide-area net-
work-services could be implemented. The largest
share of value in wide-area networks is likely to be
associated with noncommoditized characteristics
such as interconnection services, physical circuit
diversity and reliability, and pricing and protocol
options. 60 By providing a lattice for implementing
such services, SIPs would eliminate the need
among competing wide-area networks for a new
mode of interconnection in order to provide a
new service ubiquitously. Such a lattice would
lessen the importance of various forms of peering
among wide-area networks and hence decrease in-
dustry tensions associated with internet intercon-
nection.
C. Recent Industry Developments and
Institutional Possibilities
SIP-like institutions are already beginning to
emerge in the communications industry. One is
PAIX, which began operating in 1996 as a center
in California for exchanging traffic among ISPs.61
PAIX states that it is carrier-neutral, not owned by
a telco or carrier, and not affiliated with any ISP.6
2
PAIX has announced plans to open six additional
highly secure facilities for collocation and inter-
connection among ISPs in the U.S. within a
year.6 3 Another company offering SIP-like institu-
tions is Equinix, founded in 1998. Equinix builds
and operates carrier-neutral and content-pro-
vider-neutral facilities it calls "Internet Business
Exchanges" ("IBXs"). 64 Equinix offers to network
facilities providers, content providers and applica-
tions service providers a set of buildings with fi-
60 Historically the heterogeneity of user needs spurred
the development of private networks. See David Gable, Private
Telecommunications Networks: An Historical Perspective, PUBLIC
NETWORKS, PUBLIC OBjECTIvS 35-49 (Eli Noam and Aine
Nishuilleabhain eds., 1996) <www.vii.org/papers/citi509.
htm>.
61 The PAIX center in Palo Alto, Cal., was set up by Digi-
tal Equipment Corp. Currently it is a subsidiary of Metropoli-
tan Fiber Network, a seller of dark fiber connectivity. See Paix,
Paix's Neutral Internet Exchange Model and Proven Track-Record




63 The locations for the facilities are Tyson's Corner, Va.;
Atlanta, Ga.; Dallas, Tex.; Los Angeles, Ca.; and an additional
facility in Palo Alto, Ca. See Paix, Paix Announces Major Expan-
sion Plans (visited Apr. 7, 2000) <www.paix.net/press-re-
leases/I 02699-paix-expansionnew.hti>.
64 Unless otherwise noted, the information on Equinix
nancial grade security, redundant power supplies,
private and shared collocation areas, and a wide
range of options for interconnecting within the
building. Equinix currently has one IBX opera-
tional in the Washington, D.C. area and recently
signed a $1.2 billion contract for constructing
more than 30 additional IBXs in business, finan-
cial and internet hubs around the world.
65
Some real estate companies are beginning to
provide SIP-like institutions. The Rudin family,
developers and owners of one of New York's larg-
est privately owned commercial and residential
real estate portfolios, is a prime example. 66 They
developed and own the New York Information
Technology Center at 55 Broad Street, Manhat-
tan, which houses a large number of communica-
tions and new-media companies, and have estab-
lished similar facilities at 110 Wall Street and at
the former Grumman Aircraft factory on Long Is-
land. The Rudin family also recently bought a for-
mer AT&T Long Lines switching center at 32 Ave-
nue of the Americas in Manhattan, which will be
renovated and called the New York Global Con-
nectivity Center and will house network transport
providers, web-hosting companies, Internet com-
panies and switch companies. This facility also will
provide extensive support for in-building inter-
connectivity.
Most of the SIP-like institutions described above
are located in major cities and do not provide ser-
vices to end-users. In residential and rural areas,
ISPs moving to offer their end-users a variety of
network services may evolve into SIPs. Dial-up In-
ternet connectivity has become for ISPs a low-mar-
gin, commodity service that cannot sustain their
given here is from Equinix's website. See generally, Equinix
<http://www.equinix.com>.
65 According to CNET News, in May 1999, the CEO of
Equinix, Al Avery, indicated that Equinix planned to build 15
IBXs domestically. See Ben Heskitt, Start-up aims to house Net
data exchanges, CNETNews.com (May 25, 1999).
66 The subsequent information is from press releases at
<www.55broadst.Com> and Ken Branson, AT& T Sells Former
Long Lines Building for Telco Hotel, PHONE+, Dec. 16, 1999
<www.phoneplusmag.com> SIP-like institutions are generally
called "telco hotels" in the trade press. See generally Ken Bran-
son, No Vacancy, Telco Hotels Can't Go Up Fast Enough, X-
CHANGE MAGAZINE, Apr. 1999 <www.x-changemag.com>;
Jonathan Marshall, Telco Hotels Fill Up Fast, S. F. CHRONICLE,
Jul. 2, 1998 <www.boradlink.com/press/colomotion.html>.
Other nontelecom companies that offer or own collocation
services include: Colomotion <www.colomotion.com>; Hud-
son Telegraph Associates; Switch and Data Facilities Corp.
<www.switchfacilities.com>; Taconic Investors; Telecom Real
Estate Service; and Telehouse <www.telehouse.com>.
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businesses. ISPs are thus seeking to develop value-
added businesses, such as web hosting, video-con-
ferencing, e-commerce and a variety of other
wide-area network services. An impediment to the
ISPs ability to offer their customers new services is
the lack of competition in local telephony in resi-
dential and rural areas. However, as ISPs assemble
increasingly appealing offerings of network ser-
vices, they will generate strong incentives for the
entry of local facilities providers who can connect
end-users to these services. Given that numerous
ISPs provide local service in almost all regions of
the U.S.,67 they could be important to the devel-
opment of competing, independently owned SIPs
that cover all of the U.S.
IV. A FEASIBLE POLICY LEVER FOR
IMPROVING INDUSTRY STRUCTURE
Changes in voice telephony regulation to pro-
mote the development of SIPs could help over-
come the structural weaknesses that are appear-
ing in internet and telephony competition. In
particular, voice telephony regulation could seek
to establish a geographically comprehensive lat-
tice of competing, independently owned and cer-
tified SIPs. Becoming a certified SIP would involve
gaining a privileged position for voice telephony
call termination in exchange for adhering to cer-
tain ownership restrictions. All telephony service
providers in defined SIP regions would be re-
quired by regulation to provide zero-price call
(circuit-switched voice, fax and dial-up modem)
termination for calls delivered to chosen certified
SIPs in the SIP region associated with the called
customer. The owner of a certified SIP would not
be allowed to own facilities for local connectivity
in the area in which the certified SIP is located. A
certified SIP would also not be allowed to own
network facilities connecting to other certified
SIPs.
Further necessary decisions about certified SIPs
would depend on institutional circumstances.
67 See NBER WORKING PAPER No. W6453, UNIVERSAL SER-
VICE IN THE DIGITAL AGE: THE COMMERCIALIZATION AND GEOG-
RAPHY OF U. S. INTERNET AccESS (authored by Shane Green-
stein) (March 1998) <www.nber.org>.
(8 Calculation based on total voice bandwidth given in
Table 1. Voice calls among incumbent telephony customers
would not necessarily pass across SIPs.
69 Based on bandwidth for MAE East <208.234.102.97/
MAE/east.aggr.overlay.html>.
One issue is the geographic areas associated with
SIPs' voice termination roles and transport facility
ownership restrictions. In the U.S., a natural
choice is LATAs. Each state regulatory commis-
sion might certify, for a fixed term of five years,
three to five independently owned SIPs in each
LATA in the state, with all local telephony opera-
tors in the state having responsibility to terminate
calls from at least two of those SIPs. Since there
are 236 LATAs covering the U.S., such a program
would lead to roughly 750-1000 certified SIPs
spread throughout the U.S. If all voice traffic, in-
cluding local calls, passed through these SIPs,
they would have to support 1.9-2.5 Gbps of voice
traffic. 68 This is about the volume of peak data
bandwidth through a major U.S. internet inter-
connection point in late October 1999.69
There is a range of institutional possibilities for
facilities and ownership of SIPs. Independently
owned internet or private network interconnec-
tion points might be candidates to be certified
SIPs. Highly capable ISPs meeting the transport
facility ownership restrictions might also be candi-
dates to be certified SIPs. National network opera-
tors, many of whom are building large data cen-
ters, might be willing to divest transport facilities
to some data centers in order to make them can-
didates to be certified SIPs. 7 0 In addition, regula-
tors or antitrust authorities could consider requir-
ing large incumbent LECs to divest some tandem
switching offices so as to create an interconnec-
tion structure more conducive to controlling in-
cumbent LEC market power.
7'
A. Considerations of policy feasibility
Changing voice telephony regulation is a much
more propitious policy direction for influencing
evolving industry structure than is establishing
new regulations for internet peering. Large in-
cumbent LECs are widely recognized to have mar-
ket power in providing local telephony. In con-
trast, market structures for internet services are
70 AT&T, UUNet, PSINet, Qwest and Intel are talking
about building about 25 new data centers each this year. See
Kate Gerwig, Saving Future Services, TELE.COM, Jan. 10, 2000
(visited Apr. 10, 2000) <www.teledotcom.com>. Level 3 has
also built more than 25 data centers that offer a wide range
of services to collocating customers.
71 Large incumbent LECs might, in fact, find it advanta-
geous, from the perspective of transforming industry struc-
ture and maximizing asset value, to do this.
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highly dynamic, and market power arguments
with respect to internet services typically depend
significantly on speculation about future develop-
ments. While there is widespread, deeply rooted
hostility toward changing the regulatory frame-
work for internet services, telephony regulation
over time has gone through a series a major new
regulatory initiatives. Associated with that history
is the FCC's extensive knowledge and experience
with implementing telephony regulation. There is
no similar knowledge and experience with respect
to regulating internet interconnection. Moreover,
there is significant dissatisfaction with the current
state of telephony regulation, and the Telecom-
munications Act of 1996 gives the FCC broad for-
bearance authority with respect to almost all of its
regulations. Changes in voice telephony regula-
tion that promote SIPs could be accompanied
with a dramatic reduction in a wide range of
other regulations that would no longer be part of
this new implementation of a pro-competitive,
deregulatory national policy framework for the in-
dustry.
While data traffic is growing much more rapidly
than voice traffic, the value and magnitude of
voice traffic is still sufficient to influence strongly
the overall structure of network interconnection.
The first data column of Table 1 shows total
RBOC interoffice bandwidth in use. Subsequent
data columns show the total bandwidth required
for RBOC originated voice calls in different cate-
72 Despite the significant growth of private networks,
there has been relatively little analysis of them. For an in-
formed perspective late in the 1980s, see Donald A. Dunnand
and M. Gens Johnson, Demand for Data Communication, IEEE
NETWORK (May 1989). Dunn and Johnson foresaw the wide-
area interconnection of computer networks that created the
internet. They estimated that data revenue was growing 23%
per year in 1988, and anticipated that data revenue would
account for more than half of common carrier revenues in
1997. In 1997, according to the FCC SOCC Table 2.9, data
revenue accounted for about 6% of local exchange carriers
common carrier revenue. Based on data in AT&T's 1998 An-
nual Report, I estimate that about 20% of AT&T's revenue is
data revenue.
73 See K. G. Coffman, and A. M. Odlyzko, The Size and
Growth Rate of the Internet (visited Apr. 10, 2000) <http://www.
research.att.com/-amo> (estimating the effective bandwidth
of the internet core at 75Gbps at year-end 1997). They also
estimate that, with the exception of a sport in 1995 and 19964
the trend growth rate of core internet bandwidth is 100% per
year. See id. Coffman and Odlyzko estimate U.S. long-distance
voice bandwidth at 350Gbps at year-end 1997. See id. Since
RBOCs account for about 70% of U.S. local access lines, the
Coffman-Odlyzko long-distance voice bandwidth figure is
roughly in accord with the interLATA toll figures in Table 5.
gories. Assuming that all local voice traffic travels
between RBOC local exchanges, the total
bandwidth of RBOC interoffice facilities in use for
nonvoice services in 1998 was 2.4 times greater
than bandwidth needed for voice services. Most of
the nonvoice bandwidth is for leased-line services,
whose bandwidth has been growing about 40%
per year since 1989.72 Internet bandwidth in mid-
1998 was probably about 110Gbps and it is grow-
ing about 100% per year.7 3 The most important
point to take from Table 1 is that voice services
still account for an important share of network
bandwidth, although within a few years voice
bandwidth will be insignificant.74 This means that
becoming a distinguished interconnection point
for voice telephone can play an important role in
giving an interconnection point industry salience.
B. Some consideration of costs and benefits
75
A requirement that all local telephony provid-
ers in a defined geographic area provide zero-
price call termination from at least two certified
SIPs in the area has relatively small costs and large
benefits. This requirement promotes the concen-
tration of network traffic at certified SIPs and thus
helps to promote SIPs' industry significance in fu-
ture network development. This requirement also
provides an administratively simple telephony in-
terconnection regime that would allow network
operators to provide flat-rated telephone service.
On the other hand, Coffman and Odlyzko's figure for private
line and public data networks, 370 Gpbs at year-end 1997,
appears to be a significant underestimate.
74 Convergent Networks, a company that focuses on
voice networks, stated that AT& T's network carries 850 ter-
abytes of voice traffic per day as compared to 33 terabytes of
data traffic. See Om Malik, Telecom Titans, FORBES.COM, Sept.
8, 1999 (visited Apr. 10, 2000) <www.forbes.com/tool/html/
99/sep/0908/feat.htm> (reporting comments of Bing Yang,
chief technology officer and cofounder of Convergent Tech-
nologies). The specific nature of these measurements is un-
clear. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that utilization rates for
long-distance switched voice circuits (33%) are almost an or-
der of magnitude greater than utilization rates for data cir-
cuits (3-5%). See Andrew Odlyzko, The Internet and other net-
works: Utilization rates and their implications, AT&T Labs-
Research, Sept. 12, 1998 (visited Apr. 10, 2000) <wwwre-
search.att.com/-amo>. The interoffice bandwidth data in Ta-
ble 5 refers to the bandwidth of circuits in use, not the vol-
ume of traffic passing through those circuits.
75 For further discussion of questions and objections see
Douglas Galbi, Transforming Network Interconnection and Trans-
port: Policy Direction Summary <www.ssrn.com>, and forthcom-
ing in INFO.
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It would eliminate major battles such as those that
have occurred in the U.S. over reciprocal com-
pensation for switched circuit minutes associated
with dial-up internet connections.
Competition in local telephony by itself will
shift more voice traffic into interoffice networks.
Traditionally, local exchange offices were de-
signed around local calling communities so that
local calls could be completed without the need
for interoffice transport. When neighbors are
connected to competing local telephone compa-
nies, local calls require interoffice transport.7 6 As
the figures in Table 1 suggest, because local call
volumes are high relative to intraLATA and in-
terLATA toll calling, competitors shifting even a
small share of an incumbent LEC's local call
bandwidth to interoffice transport can result in a
large percentage increase in interoffice voice
transport.
77
In a competitive industry, reducing intercon-
nection management costs is probably more im-
portant than reducing the demand for interoffice
voice transport. Given the magnitude of total in-
teroffice bandwidth, doubling or tripling the
amount of interoffice voice transport would not
76 To lower their customers' phone bills for dial-up in-
ternet access, some ISPs have sought to become "virtual
neighbors" of their customers. They do this by acquiring a
number for each local calling area for which they provide
dial-up internet access and having their communications pro-
vider terminate all these numbers to the same physical point.
One result is that the incumbent operator sees more local
call minutes traveling through its interconnection trunks.
77 For a discussion of this problem in Austria, see gener-
ally Merka Martin, Manfred Nussbaumer and Ernst-Olay
Ruhle, The Influence of Interconnection Demand on Traffic Flows
require a major re-dimensioning of the over-all
network. On the other hand, managing intercon-
nection involves exchanging traffic predictions at
each interconnection point and coordinating the
installation and maintenance of new interfacing
bandwidth. Such processes are administratively
complex, error-prone and not subject to rapid
technological improvements like those driving
down bandwidth and switching costs. Nonethe-
less, industry experience thus far shows incum-
bents often seeking to require competitors to in-
terconnect with them at a relatively large number
of local offices.
78
New local telephony providers terminate calls
to their customers from relatively few publicly ad-
vertised offices. Consider Table 2, which docu-
ments some aspects of telephony network struc-
ture in the greater New York City metro area
(LATA 132). The first data column in Table 2
gives the number of rate centers served. Rate cen-
ters are a historically determined geographic par-
tition of an area: the number of rate centers
served is a rough index of the scope of a teleph-
ony provider's coverage. The second data column
of Table 2 shows offices advertised in the Local
and Network Design for an Incumbent Operator-The Austrian Ex-
ample, presented at 17th Annual ICFC Conference, Denver,
Col. Uune 16, 1999).
78 Bell Atlantic-New York asked the New York Public Ser-
vice Commission ("NY PSC") to require that interconnecting
LECs establish a geographically relevant interconnection
point ("GRIP") in every rate center that the LEC serves, un-
less the interconnecting carriers negotiate alternative ar-
rangements. See NYPSC, Case 99-C-0529, Opinion No. 99-10,
pp. 48, 62-3 (Aug. 26, 1999) (rejecting the use of GRIP).
interoffice bandwidth interLATA toll intraLATA toll Local total voice
1998 6,291 217 54 1,602 1,874
1997 4,128 221 61 1,540 1,822
1996 3,376 206 58 1,501 1,766
1995 2,762 194 66 1,456 1,716
1994 1,654 172 65 1,396 1,633
1993 1,304 156 64 1,340 1,560
1992 934 142 64 1,299 1,505
1991 729 135 66 1,256 1,457
1990 493 133 56 1,217 1,407
1989 346 157 55 1,174 1,386
Notes: Interoffice bandwidth calculated based on data in RBOC price cap annual filings. Telephony bandwidth based on FCC SOCC call
volumes, estimated call times and 9000 minutes/month/per 64 Kbps circuit.
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Exchange Routing Guide ("LERG") as delivery
points for calls to the provider's customers.7 9 New
local telephony providers cover a significantly
larger number of rate centers per call delivery
point than does Bell Atlantic. This suggests that
new local telephony providers are not seeking to
economize on transport costs by having telephony
providers deliver calls to them close to their end
customers.
The time and cost of establishing points of pres-
ence is not hindering the ability of new local te-
lephony providers to establish more termination
points for calls to their customers. Through July
1999, Bell Atlantic-NY ("BA") had provided 750
physical collocation arrangements in 175 central
offices.8 0 Of these collocation arrangements, 137
are in the greater New York City area (LATA
132).81 Nonetheless, as Table 2 shows, new teleph-
ony providers are using only 13 collocations in BA
offices in LATA 132 as points for collecting calls
from other networks. When such arrangements
are used, the larger new local telephony providers
use exclusively BA tandem offices. This fact fur-
ther suggests that the geography of interconnec-
tion points for terminating voice telephony has
thus far been determined by the historical loca-
tion of a relatively few, large incumbent offices.
Policy that requires voice telephony call termina-
tion from certified SIPs represents a dramatic
change only in the sense that it shifts voice teleph-
ony interconnection to a nonadversarial environ-
ment, i.e. competing, independently owned SIPs.
V. CONCLUSION
Policy analysts and policy-makers should con-
sider the merits of different competitive struc-
tures in the telecommunications industry. Signifi-
cant weaknesses in industry structure are
apparent in the internet and in the development
of local telephony competition. Pro-competitive
regulation for voice telephony is not adequately
considering over-all industry structure; instead, it
appears to be largely driven by particular, narrow
requests for pro-competitive interventions. None-
theless, voice telephony regulation will have an
enduring effect on industry structure even when
voice telephony is a relatively unimportant net-
work service. Armed with an understanding of the
challenges confronting both internet services and
voice telephony, such a legacy can become a tool
for improving industry performance.
Table 2
Voice Telephony Delivery Points in LATA 132
Local Telephony Rate Centers Delivery Points Ratio Colo's in Colo's in BA
Provider (a) (b) (a)/(b) BA Offices Tandems
Bell Atlantic (wireline) 126 167 0.8
AT&T (wireline) 50 13 3.8 3 3
MCI WorldCom 32 7 4.6 0 0
Nextlink 28 1 28.0 0 0
Allegiance 23 5 4.6 3 3
Cablevision Lightpath 20 7 2.9 0 0
RCN 20 6 3.3 4 4
American Network, Inc. 18 1 18.0 0 0
Frontier 18 5 3.6 4 4
WinStar 15 1 15.0 0 0
Level 3 Comm. 15 2 7.5 0 0
all other than BA 83 77 13 6
Note: Based on LERG data current for 10/1/99. AT&T (wireline) consolidates entries for ACC National Telecom, AT&T Local and Teleport.
MCI WorldCom consolidates entries for Brooks Fiber, MCIMetro and WorldCom.
79 The LERG is produced by the Traffic Routing Admin-
istration ("TRA"), Telcordia Technologies. The FCC has
published LERG data on carriers' counts of NXX to provide
an indication of the development of competition. See Local
Competition: August 1999, Industry Analysis Division, Com-
mon Carrier Bureau, FCC <www.fcc.gov/BtireaLIs/Common_
Carrier/Reports/FCC-StateLink/IAD/1 comp99-1 .pdf>.
80 See In re Application by New York Telephone Company
(d/b/a Bell Atlantic-New York), Bell Atlantic Communica-
tions, Inc., NYNEX Long Distance, and Bell Atlantic Global
Networks, Inc.,Joint Declaration of Paul A. Lacouture and Arthur
J Troy, para. 29.
"I Calculated based on LERG data on LATA's and wire
centers, and Bell Atlantic's list of offices where collocation
has been provided <www.bellatlantic.com/tis/bacolloc.htm>.
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